Tick data and newswire searches are used to find events that led to large and rapid changes in a stock future, a bond future, and three exchange rate futures. Knowledge of these events may be useful in future work. They have the advantages that they are truly surprises and that the sign of their effect on each financial market is known. The events are used in this study to analyze the effects of three types of shocks on the five variables.
Introduction
Anouncements and other events have from time to time large and rapid effects on stock and bond prices and on exchange rates. Tick data on the S&P 500 futures contract and newswire searches were used in Fair (2000) to find 69 events between 1982 and 1999 that led to a one-to five-minute price change greater than .75 percent in absolute value. In this paper 152 additional events have been found that led to such a change in either the S&P 500 future, a bond future, a deutsche mark (euro beginning 1999) future, a yen future, or a British pound future. Tick data and newswire searches were also used for this work. Section 2 discusses the data, and Section 3 discusses the procedure used to find the events.
Once the events have been found, the relationships among stock prices, bond prices, and exchange rates can be examined. Each event led to a large and rapid change in at least one of the variables, and it is of interest to see how each variable was affected by the change and whether systematic relationships can be found. The advantage of using the events to examine relationships is that the signal to noise ratio is very high. For each event the many other things that affect the relationships among the variables are swamped by the event, and so these other things are in effect held constant. Section 4 examines the relationships.
The Data
The symbols used for the futures contracts are: SP for the S&P 500, U S for the 30 year U.S. Treasury bond, DM for the deutsche mark, J Y for the yen, BP for the British pound, and EC for the euro. All but the U S contract are traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). The U S contract is traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT). The first date used in this study is April 2, 1982 GLOBEX data are missing for the last five months of 1998.
For each variable, such as SP , there are a number of contracts trading at the same time, each with a different terminal date. There is, however, always one most actively traded contract, and this is the one that was used. 2 The tick data were used to create price observations per minute. The price of the last trade in a given minute was taken to be the price for that minute. (Typically many trades take place per minute, and so there are typically many tick prices per minute.) A k-minute percentage price change is then simply the price for a given minute divided by the price k minutes ago (with 1 then subtracted and the resulting value multiplied by 100). Table 1 presents a summary of the data. For the SP contract, for example, there are 2,200,079 price-level observations, 1,980,091 1 All times in this paper are Eastern even though the CME and CBT are in the Central time zone. 2 The tick data were purchased from the Futures Industry Institute and Tick Data Inc. Tick data were also purchased for the Nikkei 225 futures contract and the T-Bill futures contract, both traded on the CME. The trading in these contracts, however, was too thin for the data to be useful. The Nikkei 225 data began September 25, 1990 , and there were 169,044 price-level observations. The T-Bill data began January 4, 1982, and there were 270,700 price-level observations. 3 one-minute changes, and 1,940,153 five-minute changes. There are fewer changes than levels because a k-minute change requires price levels k minutes apart, and this is not always the case. (In some minutes no trades take place.) For the SP contract the standard deviation is .048 for the one-minute changes and .107 for the five-minute changes. The standard deviations for the other contracts range from .032 to .037 for the one-minute changes and from .064 to .070 for the five-minute changes. The means of all the changes, which are not presented in the table, are very close to zero.
The one-through five-minute percentage price changes were then searched for large and rapid changes. Any change was considered large if it was greater than .75 percentage points in absolute value. Given that the above standard deviations range from .032 to .107, a change of .75 in absolute value is unusual, i.e., very large. Each minute was flagged if it ended a large one-or two-or three-or fouror five-minute change. Some minutes were, of course, flagged more than once.
Counting multiple flagging as only one flag, there were 2,220 flagged minutes for SP , 371 for U S, 293 for DM, 17 for EC, 427 for J Y , and 187 for BP . The same minute was sometimes flagged for more than one contract. The flagged minutes were then searched in the manner discussed next. 
Searching for Events
For each flagged minute a search was undertaken to see if some announcement or other event occurred within about five minutes of the flagged minute. (Remember that a change for a flagged minute can be anywhere from a one-to a five-minute change, where the flagged minute is at the end of the change.) The Dow Jones
Interactive service on the internet was used for this purpose. This service allows one to search for news reports by time of day. The following four news services were searched: Dow Jones News Service, Associated Press Newswire, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal.
As noted in Section 1, 69 events were found in Fair (2000) for the SP contract.
The additional searching came up with 152 more events, for a total of 221. These events are listed in Table 2 , and the rest of this section is a discussion of this table. Notes: a = contract being used when the event was found. sp means the event was found in Fair (2000) . b = type of event: R = monetary, P = price, Y = real, F = fiscal policy, Z = ECI, C = company, T = trade gap, X = international rumors and comments, W = international conflicts, I = foreign exchange intervention, J = Japan, G = Germany. Percentage changes are at quarterly rates for ECI, annual rates for GDP and the GDP deflator, and monthly rates for all others. Abbreviations: BOJ = Bank of Japan. bp = basis points. CPI = consumer price index; core excludes food and energy. ECI = employment cost index. FX = foreign exchange. GDP = real GDP. NAPM = National Association of Purchasing Managers. PPI = producers price index; core excludes food and energy. wage = average hourly earnings from the establishment survey.
As can be seen in Table 2 , many of the events are 8:30 government announcements. One of these announcements is the monthly employment report. It contains data from both the household survey and the establishment survey. The main variable of interest from the household survey is the unemployment rate, and the main two variables of interest from the establishment survey are the number of jobs (called "payrolls") and average hourly earnings. The variable that gets the most attention is the payroll variable, with the average hourly earnings variable second.
The payroll value is listed in Table 2 along with the average hourly earnings value (called "wage" in the table) when it was available from the press reports. The "event" for this announcement is, of course, the entire employment report.
The other monthly 8:30 announcements are those for 1) the consumer price index (CPI), 2) the producer price index (PPI), 3) the U.S. balance of trade (the "trade gap"), 4) retail sales, 5) orders for durable goods, and 6) housing starts.
The two quarterly 8:30 announcements are for the employment cost index (ECI), a measure of wage costs, and the national income and product accounts. The two variables listed in the table from the national income and product accounts are real GDP and the GDP deflator. In the early part of the period the retails sales announcement was at 14:30.
Another announcement is for industrial production. In the early part of the period it was at 9:30, and it is now at 9:15. In the early part of the period the money supply (M1) announcement was important, and it was at 16:10. An important non government announcement is the report of the National Association of Purchasing Managers (NAPM), and this is at 10:00.
The exact times for the events that are not regularly scheduled announcements 9 are not always clear. The exact times of the news reports are not always given, and even when they are, it may be that the report was written a few minutes after the event (rather than, say, just one minute after the event). If a time was given in the report, it is indicated in Table 2 ; otherwise, "?time" is listed in the table.
Remember, then, that when a time is given in the table for a non regularly scheduled announcement, the event may have taken place a few minutes earlier.
The order of the searching for events using the large changes was SP , U S, DM, EC, J Y , and BP . Table 2 indicates which contract observations were being used when the particular event was found. 3 Many of the 8:30 announcements were not found using the SP contract (but instead using the U S or DM contract) because the SP contract was not traded at 8:30 until 1994. All the trade gap announcements were found using the exchange rate contracts.
For reference purposes the 221 events were divided into 12 kinds, and each kind is denoted by a letter in Table 2 . R denotes monetary events, primarily money supply announcements and interest rate announcements. In October 1982 the Fed announced that it was going to put less weight on monetary aggregate targets in the future, and soon after that the money supply announcements ceased being important, with interest rate announcements taking their place. The interest rate announcements are regarding the federal funds and/or discount rate. The funds rate is more important than the discount rate, and it is listed in Table 2 Interventions are usually not announced, but simply observed by market participants as they are happening. Finally, J denotes events that are specific to Japan, and G denotes events that are specific to Germany. The events are organized into these 12 categories in Table 3 . This table is used in the next section.
Five-minute changes are also presented in Table 2 (and Table 3 ) for each event.
Although the searching for large changes was done using one-through five-minute changes for each contract, only five-minute changes are presented in the table.
The five-minute change is from a "base" minute (minute 0) to the minute five minutes away (minute 5). For each scheduled announcement, the base minute was taken to be the minute right before the announcement, such as 8:29 for a 8:30
announcement. For the other events a plot of the price level per minute for each variable was made around the approximate time of the event (which is known from the searching), and the plots were examined for price jumps. The base minute was taken to be the minute right before the price jump. In almost all cases it was obvious where the price jump occurred-at most the error in choosing the base minute is a minute. In the few cases where it was not obvious, judgment had to be used, and in these cases the error could be as large as three or four minutes. The See Table 2 for notes and abbreviations.
base minute chosen for each event is presented in Table 2 .
It may be for a given variable that the price level for minute 0 and/or minute 5 does not exist. When this was true, the following price-level pairs were tried in the order specified, and the procedure was stopped when data for a pair existed. If at the end no pairs existed, no change is presented in Table 2 Note that it may be that no change for an event in Table 2 is greater than .75
in absolute value. It may be, for example, that only the three-minute change was this large, and it is not presented in the table. The maximum of the one-through five-minute changes for each variable could have been used in Table 2 , but for comparison purposes across variables it seemed better to use (whenever possible) the same change for each.
It is important to stress that each event in Table 2 Table 2 what led, if anything, to the change.
The main point here is that almost without exception the brokers would say the event.
There are two types of possible errors regarding the construction of Table 2 .
One is that the event that was chosen did not in fact cause the large price changes.
It may be that a few events, especially those put in category X, have been chosen in error, but there are not likely to be many of these. Almost all the chosen events are the obvious causal events for the large price changes. When, for example, there is a large price jump between the end of minute 8:29 and the end of minute 8:30 and there was a widely followed announcement at 8:30, it is obvious that the announcement was the cause. There is little possibility of error here.
The other type of possible error is that an event was missed for a large price change. The most likely error is an event for which there was no news report. Less likely is a news report that was listed in the search but that was not noticed as an important event. It is difficult to know how many errors of this type were made, but there are clearly likely to be some. So Table 2 should at least be a little larger than it is. Note also that many more large price changes and events would likely have been found had the GLOBEX market been in existence prior to 1994. For sake of the analysis in Section 4, the missing of events cuts the number of observations that are available for study, so efficiency is lost, but there is no necessary bias introduced.
It should be stressed that the events that have been found are not necessarily surprises in the sense of an actual value differing from an expected value, although most of them probably are. Even if the actual value is equal to the expected value, the relieving of uncertainty may affect prices. In the rest of this paper, however, the words 'surprise' and 'shock' will be used to describe the events, but keep in mind this caveat.
Aside from examining the relationship among variables, which is done in the next section, Table 2 examine five-minute changes using FTSE-100 data and data on the dollar/pound and DM/pound exchange rates.
A general finding in this literature is that both trading volume and price volatility are quite high around announcement times-much higher than otherwise.
Some of the exchange rate data that have been used, such as in Andersen and
Bollersley ( Estimating surprises in this way is crude, especially if autoregressive equations are used, and it may be that even a large difference is not a surprise. Also, even if the difference is a surprise, it may have essentially no impact on financial markets.
The events in Table 2 have the advantage that they are truly surprises in that they caused a large and rapid change in at least one financial market. The sign of the effect of each surprise on each financial market is also known, which indicates whether the surprise was positive or negative. If, for example, a CPI announcement led to a decrease in U S (i.e., an increase in the long rate), this indicates that the surprise part of the change in the CPI was positive (the CPI was larger than expected).
Relationships Among the Variables The Bond Price (U S) and Stock Price (SP )
A monetary shock (R) or price shock (P ) or real shock (Y ) is defined here to be positive if it results in a decrease in the bond price (U S). If U S depends negatively on expected future short term interest rates, which is assumed here, then a positive shock is one in which there is an increase in expected future short rates. All three types of shocks affect U S if they affect expectations about future Fed behavior.
A positive shock is one that leads to expectations of future Fed tightening, which immediately decreases U S.
It will be useful to organize the discussion around three "propositions." These propositions are hypotheses about the signs of the three types of shocks on various expectations and the signs of the expectations on the stock price (SP ). It will be seen that the propositions have implications that are supported by the data in Table   3 . The propositions are stated in terms of positive shocks, but everything is meant to hold in reverse for negative shocks. What do these three propositions imply about the data in Table 3 Given that the signs for the P and Y shocks are almost always the same, it is clear that effects 1 and 2 dominate effects 3 and 4.
The key implication from the three propositions, however, does not concern the sign of the changes, which as just noted can go either way for the P and Y shocks, but the size of SP relative to size of U S. The three propositions imply that the SP response relative to the U S response should be smaller for the P and Y shocks than for the R shocks. This is because effects 3 and 4 are positive and therefore offset some of effects 1 and 2, which are negative.
Note that having observations on both SP and U S is crucial for examining this implication. Shocks differ in the sizes of their impacts on expected future short term interest rates, and a measure of the size of the impact of a given shock on expected future rates is U S. Examining SP relative to U S is a way of accounting for the different sizes of the impacts.
The propositions also imply that the SP response relative to the U S response is likely to be smaller for Y shocks than for P shocks because effect 4 is only operating for Y shocks. This is true unless effect 3 is much larger for a P shock than for a Y shock and results in effect 3 for the P shock being larger than the sum of effects 3 and 4 for the Y shock. As will be seen, the data suggest that this is not the case.
These implications can be examined by regressing SP i on U S i :
where i denotes either a R, P , or Y observation. The propositions imply that α should be larger for the R observations than for the P and Y ones. They also imply that α is likely to be larger for the P observations than for the Y ones.
The estimates of α are presented in Table 4 for the three sets of observations.
The estimate is 1.68 for the R observations, 1.03 for the P observations, and .75
for the Y observations. This is exactly as expected. The difference between 1.68 and 1.03 has a t-statistic of 1.37, and the difference between 1.68 and .75 has a Observations used for the regressions are from Table 3 . R = monetary shocks P = price shocks Y = real shocks t-statistic of 2.08. 4 The R and Y difference is thus statistically significant, but the R and P difference is not. The t-statistic for the difference between 1.03 and .75 is 1.28, and so the P and Y difference is also not statistically significant. Given the small sample sizes, however, one cannot expect much precision, and it is at least encouraging that the relative sizes are as expected. If the two R observations are omitted that have the opposite signs for U S i and SP i (events 175 and 216), the estimate of α for the R observations rises to 2.25 with the t-statistic for the difference between the R and Y observations rising to 4.00 and the t-statistic for the difference between the R and P observations rising to 3.08. The results thus provide some support to the existence of effects 3 and 4, especially effect 4.
Some of the other results in Table 3 regarding SP and U S are the following.
The three wage (Z) observations are similar to the price ones. The estimate of α for the three observations is .94, which is close to the 1.03 for the P observations.
One might expect wage shocks to have a smaller effect on expected future nominal earnings than do price shocks because of higher expected wage bills, which means that α should be larger for the wage shocks than for the price shocks. In fact the estimates are essentially the same.
The fiscal policy (F ), company (C), and international conflict (W ) shocks seem likely to have more effect on expected future earnings than on expected future interest rates. It is generally the case in Table 3 In what follows all changes in U.S. variables are both absolute and relative to the respective variables for Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Again, it will be useful to organize the discussion around three propositions. The relevant data in Table 3 for these three propositions are the R, P , and Y shocks for which observations on U S, DM, J Y , and BP exist. There are 14 R shocks, 27 P shocks, and 66 Y shocks that meet this requirement, for a total of 107 observations.
In the following discussion DM will be used as the exchange rate, but the same analysis holds for J Y and BP . A key implication from Propositions 4 and 5 is that the size of DM relative to size of U S should be smaller for the P shocks than for the R shocks. This is because effect 7 for the P shock is positive and therefore offsets some of the negative effect from effect 5 for the P shock.
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The propositions also imply that DM relative to U S should be smaller for the P shocks than for the Y shocks because effect 8 is only operating for the Y shocks. This is true unless effect 7 is much larger for a P shock than for a Y shock and results in effect 7 for the P shock being larger than the sum of effects 7 and 8 for the Y shock. As will be seen, the data suggest that this is not the case. These implications can be examined by regressing DM i on U S i :
where i denotes either a R, P , or Y observation. The propositions imply that α should be smaller for the P observations than for the R ones. They also imply that α is likely to be smaller for the P observations than for the Y ones.
The estimates of α are presented in Table 4 for the three sets of observations and the three exchange rates. For all three exchange rates the estimate of α is smaller for the P observations than for the R and Y observations, which is as expected.
The three t-statistics for the R versus P differences are 1.11, 0.52, and 2.02, and the three t-statistics for the Y versus P differences are 1.72, 1.64, and 1.15. Again, even though the precision is not high, it is at least encouraging that all six of the relative sizes are as expected. The results provide some support to the existence of effects 7 and 8.
The other results in Table 3 
Conclusion
The 221 events in Table 2 are important shocks in that they caused a large and rapid change in one or more of the U.S. stock market, the U.S. bond market, the market for deutsche marks, the market for yen, and the market for British pounds.
Knowledge of these events may be useful in future work. As discussed at the end of Section 2, the events have the advantages that they are truly surprises and that the sign of their effect of each surprise on each financial market is known.
The organization of the shocks into different types in Table 3 can be used to examine the effects of the different types. The implications of Propositions 1-6 are supported by the data. The change in the stock price (SP ) relative to the change in the bond price (U S) is larger for monetary shocks than for price and real shocks and larger for price shocks than for real shocks. The change in an exchange rate (DM, J Y , or BP ) relative to the change in the bond price is smaller for price shocks than for monetary and real shocks. In terms of the effects listed in the propositions, the results suggest that while effects 1, 2, 5, and 6 are strong, there is some support for the existence of effects 3, 4, 7, and 8.
